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This paper discusses the development of labour relations during the 1980s in
Western Europe. It argues that a proper understanding of the different trajectories in
different countries cannot be understood by taking into account either state policies
or employers preferences alone. Through their local sections, labour unions are able
to impose costs on employers when these want to reorganise firms in order to adapt
to changing markets exigencies. Adjustment therefore is conditioned by the
organisation of employers in the economy, and of unions in the firm. The paper
combines these two dimensions, and discusses their impact upon patterns of
adjustment in labour relations during the 1980s in Germany, Sweden, Belgium, the
UK, France and the Netherlands.
Zusammenfassung
In dem Papier wird die Entwicklung der Arbeitsbeziehungen in Europa während der
achtziger Jahren analysiert. Dabei wird davon ausgegangen, daß ein angemessenes
Verständnis der unterschiedlichen Anpassungspfade in den jeweiligen Ländern
unmöglich ist, wenn nur auf die staatliche oder die Interessenspolitik der Arbeitgeber
Bezug genommen wird. Durch ihre betrieblichen Organisationseinheiten können die
Gewerkschaften den Arbeitgebern Kosten aufzwingen, wenn diese ihr Unternehmen
reorganisieren wollen, um sich veränderten Marktbedingungen anzupassen. Deshalb
wird die Anpassung von dem Organisationsgrad der Arbeitgeber und der  Gewerk-
schaften in den Unternehmen geprägt. In dem Papier werden diese beiden
Dimensionen zusammengefaßt und ihr  Einfluß auf Veränderungsmuster in den
industriellen Beziehungen während der achtziger Jahre in Deutschland, Schweden,
Belgien, Großbritannien, Frankreich und den Niederlanden diskutiert.Table of Contents
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The 1980s are, even more, perhaps, than the 1970s, a transitional period in the
political economies of OECD countries. In the 1970s, there was at least some
hope, and definitely a wish that the pre-1973 world would return. The famous
Mc Cracken report in 1977 e.g., a report written by a group of economic
experts, interpreted the crisis as an unhappy ”bunching” of circumstances, not
the beginning of a period of structural adjustment. Only ten years later, by the
mid-1980s, political-economic analyses only interpreted the crisis as structural
adjustment.
Signs of structural adjustment —but as of yet unclear from where to
where—  are everywhere: the shift to monetarist economic policy and inflation-
control as the primary government goal, experimentation with new modes of
production (sometimes relying more on machines than (de-skilled) workers,
sometimes on a highly qualified, flexible workforce) the reorganisation of the
advanced industrialised countries in three trade blocks (NAFTA, EU and
ASEAN), the restructuring of large companies into decentralised business units,
etc. In short, whatever appeared to be conventional wisdom —or stronger,
perhaps, taken for granted— in the last years of the 1970s, was entirely
disqualified as outdated economic or industrial policy ten years later.
The same thing happened in the labour market as well. If there is one
general observation on the developments in European political economy during
the 1980s that is accepted by most observers, then it must be that the relative
power and assertiveness of the parties in the labour market has been reversed.
Whereas during the 1960s and to a large extent during the 1970s as well,
labour unions commanded the agenda of industrial relations, in the 1980s
employers have come to occupy that field —in part pushed by the ideological
turn toward the market, in part as a result of increased international competition
in export sectors which limited the possibilities for positive-sum type adjustment
strategies.
Propelled by these changes, the study of the political economy of
advanced capitalist countries gradually changed in character. Dominated in the
early 1980s by analyses of neo-corporatism, with most of the research attention
directed toward the organisational structures of labour unions and their relations
with government and employers (Berger 1981; Goldthorpe 1984b), the field
changed and by the mid- and late 1980s was directing much of its attention to
the role of employers’ organisations (Swenson 1993; Soskice 1990; Thelen
1994).2
Two ideas are at the basis of these analyses. The first is that employers —
capital— are far more important in capitalist economies than labour, since it
determines, perhaps not always unilaterally but nonetheless in a highly
autonomous manner, when, where and what to invest, thus determining in large
part both aggregate employment and the quality of work. In recent years,
therefore, a veritable flood of works argued the increased importance of capital
in determining the evolution of collective bargaining and changes in company
organisation in Western Europe.
The second observation is that employers in fact always were far more
critical in the creation and organisation of the post-war political economy of
Western Europe than most of the labour-centered analyses presumed or
accepted: even in the social-democratic flagship Sweden, employers played a
critical role in shaping the post-war settlement (Swenson 1995), and without the
strong employers’ associations, German capitalism might well look remarkably
like the Anglo-Saxon variant. As the post-war settlement unravelled, in other
words, important new studies shed a different light on its origins than what was
generally accepted.
With the new interpretation came the realisation of diversity among the
advanced capitalist states. Labour outcomes have been very different in what
appeared up until the late 1970s as a large block of very similar countries with
very similar political-economic institutional arrangements (Boyer 1979; Lange et
al. 1982; Gourevitch et al. 1984; Armstrong et al. 1991). In all countries, labour
unions have gone through a protracted crisis of adjustment, but not everywhere
did this crisis have the same consequences. (Turner 1991). In the UK, for
example, the labour unions were literally smashed in the 1980s (Hyman 1995;
Howell 1995). In France, it appears that unions have become largely irrelevant
outside the public sector and in a very few sectors and large enterprises where
they remain protected (Rosanvallon 1988; Mouriaux 1993; Daley 1996). To
some extent, this is also what happened in the Netherlands (Visser 1990a). In a
very small group of countries, unions appear to have kept much of their ground:
in Germany, despite the dual challenge of unification and European integration
(Silvia 1994, Turner 1996), and in Sweden, despite the gigantic employment
crisis the country faces Martin 1994; Mahon 1995). In Sweden and Germany,
but also in Belgium and Austria, the path of economic and industrial adjustment
embarked upon in the 1980s was considerably more benign to labour than in
other countries. And in a country like Italy, the general outcome, which was
already uncertain because of the gigantic exercise in self-reconstruction taking
place inside the labour movement, has become even more unpredictable as a
result of the general political volatility since 1992 (Locke 1990; Locke 1995).
Why did these adjustment paths differ as much as they did? Why were the
labour relations outcomes at the end of the 1980s so different in the various
European countries, ranging from highly co-operative, as in Sweden, Germany3
and Belgium, over labour-irrelevant, as in France
1 and the Netherlands, to
labour-exclusive, as in the UK? Why is it that, despite the supposed general
move away from Fordist mass-production in all European countries, the modes
of labour integration into this new order diverge so fundamentally?
The argument that I will make in this paper borrows tremendously from the
newly (re-)discovered role of capital: because of their strategic role in capitalist
economies, and because of the organisational advantages of capital over
labour, employers play a considerably more determining role in contemporary
capitalism. The major weakness of much of the postwar literature on the impact
of social-democratic politics on a variety of fields in the political economies of
OECD-countries is that it has gradually blended out this determining role of
capital in capitalist economies. The renewed attention for the role of employers
in the literature thus provided a welcome corrective to this literature.
However, things are not quite as simple as they seem. In a fragmentary
and sometimes tenuous way since the First World War in most countries, but
streamlined, rationalised and institutionalised since WW II, employers have
been forced to come to terms with insitutions of the working class in developing
their strategies. Labour unions, social-democratic parties, and the legal and
institutional frameworks as a result of their policies have precisely been the
checks on the laissez-faire capitalism of the previous period. And these
institutions matter in understanding adjustment in capitlaist economies.
This paper amends the new orthodoxy by re-introducing labour unions into
the picture and attempts to interpret the role of the state as a result of the
interactions of employers’ strategies and those of labour unions. The explana-
tion for the differing paths of adjustment builds on three elements: (a) the
strength of local (i.e. firm-level) labour union institutions in the early 1980s; (b)
the strength and position of employers’ associations in the national political
economy of the early 1980s; and (c) the alliance between labour or capital with
the state.
Substantively, the argument is the following. In response to the broad
economic and industrial changes of the 1980s, firms were pushed to
reorganise. Where local unions were strong, they were able to force employers
to do this in a way that took into account workers’ (and unions’) interests. These
union strategies then interacted with employers’ organisation. In some
                                                          
1 I call the outcome in France labor-irrelevant, since rather than attempting to crush unions, as
e.g. Thatcher did in the UK, and Reagan in the USA, government and industry searched for a
way to circumvent labor. That this eventually led to the virtual disappearance of the labor
unions was a  for employers fortunate by-product of this startegy, but, I would contend, not the
ultimate goal. The ultimate goal was, rather, to try and build a German-style “responsible” labor
union and industrial relations system (see Howell 1992; Weber 1986; Morville 1985 for details).4
countries, as a result of the strong organisation of employers, this was done in
a highly co-operative manner, either through the autonomy granted to labour
unions and employers as a result of what is called in Germany “Tarifautonomie”
(a condition existing in many other countries as well), or as a result of a labour-
dominated government that restricted the room to manoeuvre of employers.
Conversely, in cases where local unions were able to impose restrictions on
change but where employers are poorly organised, as in the UK and in a
different way in France, an alliance between the state and capital was a
necessity to break out of the stalemate that ensued. The end result in these
cases was a labour-exclusionary path.
The remainder of this paper develops this argument in three steps. The first
section establishes the baseline of the early 1980s: using only two dimensions
—the strength of local labour unions and the strength of employer
associations— I will schematically classify the six cases that will figure in the
rest of this paper: Germany, Sweden, Belgium, the UK, France and the
Netherlands.
2 The second section links these initial starting points to the
consequences it had for industrial relations outcomes in the 1980s. For each of
the countries it interprets the developments between 1980 and 1990 in light of
the initial starting point: the relative power of local unions and employers. The
third section summarises the findings and links them to the broader debate on
historical institutionalism.
Before embarking upon this comparative analysis, one small clarification is
in order. Precisely because of the nature of the variables in the argument —
local union strength and the strength of employer associations— a lot of sub-
national variation is likely: even similar institutional arrangements which favour
labour unions may produce very different results because of the actions taken
by labour unionists and employers, and employers are intrinsically stronger or
weaker in particular sectors or in particular regions, as a result of how the
sectoral, regional or firm production profile inserts them into the international
economy.
3 Yet despite this variation, broad national patterns persist, because
of the constraining features of national economies, laws and traditions. For
example: despite considerable differences between large companies in France,
even the “most progressive” ones rely on a number of industrial readjustment
strategies such as a mild form of labour-exclusion (“labour-irrelevance?”),
                                                          
2 I selected these cases because they capture the variation I want to highlight and because I am
reasonably clear about developments during the 1980s in them.
3 For example: industrial relations have always been more peaceful in the chemical sector than
in the car industry, for reasons that are related to the product itself. Chemicals are capital- and
R&D-intensive products, and wages account, in big chemical firms, on average only for some
10% of product cost. Hence industrial strife never takes the form there it does in labor-intensive
standardised commodity-producing industries such as the car industry. See also Herrigel 1995b
and Locke 1995 on different regional industrial orders.5
relatively narrow tasks, mass-production strategy, state-guided adjustment and
relatively hierarchical relations with their suppliers, which are also found among
the “most conservative” ones. Similar things can be said for German or English
firms: the variation within each of these countries, should not be taken solely to
imply the absence of similarities, especially in comparative perspective. Despite
increased variation between companies, firms in these countries have retained
a set of characteristics which is very distinctive from the organisation of the firm
in other countries.
Second, even the most vocal proponents of internal variation attribute it to
the internationalisation of product markets that large firms face, a phenomenon
which is generally thought to have gained importance only in the 1980s, with
increased competition from Japanese firms in market segments where
European firms were dominant, and the liberalisation of trade between the US,
Europe and Japan (for example: Sabel 1989; Herrigel 1995a; Locke 1990).
4
The stylised pictures of national profiles in 1980 therefore date from a period
when there was arguably more homogeneity inside national models than today.
2. The political economy of Western Europe in 1980
The purpose of this section is to establish a basis for comparison between the
different national industrial relations systems that adjusted very differently
during the 1980s. The demise of the post-war settlements in the late 1970s,
ironically enough, was heralded at a moment that labour unions were
numerically and even politically at their peak in all or most of the European
countries (see Visser 1990b for the figures; and Crouch & Pizzorno 1978 for
discussions of their role in the political economies of Western Europe).
Precisely the recognition of the different post-war settlements ultimately led to a
revival of the national trajectories literature.
However, as most of the analyses in political economy in the period
between 1975 and 1985, this debate completely ignored the role played by
capital in the construction of the post-war settlements. Once employers are
added in as a relevant variable, we recognise that there are very different
modes of labour integration in the different countries in this analysis. In what
follows, I will build a classification system for the countries discussed here, on
the basis of the position of the local union in the company (see Hancké 1993
for details), and of the coherence in employers organisation (see Soskice 1990;
                                                          
4 Andrew Glyn points out that the internationalisation of the economy may well be a rather
hollow phrase: the proportion of exports to GNP and imports penetration was, in 1990, not
much higher than in 1913, and only slightly higher than in 1950 and in 1970. See Glyn 1995b.6
Soskice 1991). In part this reflects the emergence of a relatively large new
literature on shopfloor organisation (see, for example, Thelen 1991; Turner
1991; Locke 1990). But in part this also follows from the observation that strong
employer organisations and strong national unions appear to be positively
correlated in all the cases discussed: in 1980 one only found strong national
union movements in countries with strong employers associations. The recent
literature on the role of employers in the organisation of the economy since
1945 suggests in this regard that the strength of the national union was a direct
result of the strength of the employers associations rather than vice versa. The
national union strength was, in other words, probably as much a product of
employers’ strength as the result of an independent power basis.
A similar correlation does not hold for local unions, however, which
suggests that the power basis of local unions is different and has different
consequences for the operation of industrial relations: in the UK weak
employers organisations co-exist(ed) with very strong local union structures,
while in the Netherlands the opposite is true: local unions are very weak, but
capital is highly organised. Table 1 organises these points in a schematic way.
Table 1: Classification of national cases, 1980
strong weak







German, Swedish and Belgian unions usually show up in comparative tables as
cases of high to very high centralisation. Alongside this strong central structure,
however, exist equally strong firm-level unions, which act both as
representatives of the workforce in large (export) companies and as recruitment
channels for the labour unions. Characteristically in all three countries, the
labour unions control the official institutions for workers participation. In
Germany, over 75% of the members of works councils are union members and
they coordinate these actions with the labour union sections (Vertrauensleute).
In Sweden, local “shopfloor clubs” (Verkstadsklubben) not only negotiate
company agreements with the firm since the 1976 Co-determination Law, they7
also recruit every newly arrived worker. In Belgium, finally, in principle all of the
works councilors are elected on a union slate, and firm-level negotiations are
fully under control of the local and regional union officials. In all these
committees, moreover, small grievances are quickly handled by the local
unions. Local unions are, as this short stylised sketch shows, a critical factor in
the firm for both workers and employers (Kjellberg 1983).
Employers, in turn, are well-organised in these three countries. In
Germany, the industry federations are (or were up until recently at least, if we
are to believe recent reports of associational breakdown), capable of
sanctioning individual firms which broke out of central arrangements on issues
as diverse as collective bargaining, training and general social policy (see Silvia
1994 for details of both strength and recent breakdown). In Sweden and
Belgium, the organisation is in part reflected in those employers associations as
well (Soskice 1990). Additionally, in Sweden, large companies in the export
sectors are part of large financial conglomerates -holdings- which allows for
high coordination capacities among the large firms (Kurzer 1993). In Belgium,
most large firms are subsidiaries of German multinationals in the engineering
and chemical sector; the others are intergated into the financial world in a
similar way as in Sweden.
The situation in the UK contrasts sharply with this picture. Employers in the
UK constitute, by many accounts, a strongly atomised mass of firms, who,
individually and without much regard for broader goals, pursue cost-cutting
strategies. The results are best shown in training matters, where individual
firms, caught between an awareness of the need for higher skills but paralysed
by free-riding possibilities, opt not to train their workers (Soskice & Finegold
1988).
Local unions, on the other hand, are, as a result of their historical
development, very strong. They can, as the heroic (but ultimately futile)
resistance of the printing unions against technological innovation and work
reorganisation between the 1960s and 1986 demonstrated, block many
changes without employers being able to push through reform. Yet in contrast
to unions in Germany, Sweden and Belgium, British unions are not integrated in
firm-level decision-structures, primarily because they do not exist, and the
labour unions have never shown any interest in creating them as tools for their
policies. This seriously limits the possible constructive dimensions of labour
union action, and as a result, local unions need not figure in employers’
calculations if these manage to circumvent them and implement changes after
all.
In the Netherlands, local unions are simply weak or close to non-existent.
As a result of choices made immediately after the Second World War, Dutch
unions traded local representation for a strong voice in national corporatist8
settlements —an act known as “the Great Exchange” and a feat for which the
country rightly became famous. As a result, labour unions in the Netherlands
never were strong in the firms: works councils are not controlled by the union
confederation FNV the way they are in Germany, Sweden or Belgium; and even
where union officials are council members, it is an important point for them to
develop a line that is highly independent from union policy (Hancké & Slomp
1996).
Dutch employers are considerably more organised: the employers’
confederations are legitimate representatives of their companies in collective
bargaining with the labour unions, and their position is equally unquestioned by
the state (Windmuller et al. 1987; Windmuller & Gladstone 1984). Yet, as
Flanagan et al. (Flanagan et al. 1983) point out, the country’s dualist (or,
perhaps better, three-sided) economic structure is reflected in the
representation of employers’ interests. The economy is dominated by important
international financial groups (ING group and ABN-AMRO are among the ten
largest European banks), and by multinational corporations (Philips, Shell,
AKZO), who frequently opt out of the conventional collective bargaining game
by raising wages against negotiated collective agreements to obtain the
necessary qualified workforce (Kurzer 1993). What emerges, therefore, among
employers, is a dual structure, with large exporting companies and the financial
sector on the one hand, who, in a relatively coordinated way escape collective
bargaining and incomes policies clauses that are too strict, and the small firms
and domestic companies, on the other, who follow the path set out by the tri-
partite negotiations.
The final national case is France. That French employers are weak is one
of the few unquestioned commonplaces in comparative political economy. The
French state was, especially since the Second World War, so dominant that
large firms came or remained under its aegis and were unable develop
strategies of their own. On many occasions, French firms had to accept nosy
micro-management from the state, their ultimate owner (Zysman 1977; Zysman
1983).
Better hidden, however, are the labour unions' weaknesses in the plants.
For a variety of reasons, labour unions were, after 1968 when local union
sections were recognised by law, never very interested in the workplace as
anything else than a crude recruiting ground. Essentially, French unions
refused to take seriously the representation of workers' interests in the
workplace, refuted firm-level negotations as "class collaboration," and geared
most if not all of their energies toward an uneasy mixture of industry-level wage
bargaining and macro-political action. As a result of this political history, the
workplace was and is virtually unknown to French unions, and French unions
increasingly lost the few beachheads left in firm-level decision-making:9
throughout the 1980s, the three union confederations for workers combined lost
the majorities they held in the works councils (see Ross 1987).
This scheme is the basis for the rest of this paper. Combining these two
dimensions —the organisation of employers and the role of local unions in firm-
level decision-making— helps us understand the different paths of adjustment
in the different countries. Where local unions were strong, much depended on
how employers were able to deal with this "obstacle." Where employers were
also well-organised, the path of adjustment was generally relatively favorable to
labour. Where they were not, the state was called in to help employers in their
search for a deregulated labour market. Interestingly, in countries where neither
labour nor capital was strong, the state was able to reorganise industry roughly
on its own terms.
3. Different adjustment paths in the 1980s
In analysing adjustment paths in the 1980s, three actors need to be taken into
account: labour unions, whose strength is deduced from their local structures,
employers’ associations, and the state. The state may be an autonomous agent
(Skocpol et al. 1985), but this does not necessarily imply that the state is also
capable of implementing its policies. For the purposes of this paper I assume
that it needs a certain degree of co-operation from the other central actors in
the economy for policy-making and, above all, implementation. Simply put:
when either labour or employers are fundamentally opposed to state policies,
policies do not change. In a coalition with the other party in the triangle,
however, state policies can reach, at least in part, their stated goals. In order to
understand the particular patterns of adjustment, the crucial factor is therefore
how the state entered into a coalition with labour or employers in situations
where a stalemate appeared to emerge.
3.1. Strong local unions and coordinated capital:
the search for flexible adjustment in Germany, Belgium and
Sweden
In essence, the strength of local labour unions makes unilateral changes by
employers impossible in these countries. Both unions and (even officially non-
union) bodies of workers’ representation are involved in firm-level
reorganisation, frequently with the help of labour union-affiliated outside
experts.10
Two paths of adjustment are, given this setup, possible. In the first,
adjustment is negotiated and takes place outside the state, and sometimes in
clear opposition to state government policies. This was the case in Germany
after the coalition change (from SPD-FDP to CDU-FDP) in 1982, in Belgium
under the conservative governments of the early 1980s (1981-1987) and under
the Swedish bourgeois government between 1976 and 1982. In all three
countries - albeit less so in Sweden - governments made attempts to change
important parts of the labour market, but ran up against a (de facto) united
block of labour unions and employers. In Germany and Sweden this led to very
small changes within an otherwise stable collective bargaining system. In
Belgium, labour unions and employers, unable to block policies, engaged in
fragmented acts of “civil disobedience,” expressed in under table the
negotiation of substantial “non-wage” wage increases (restaurant checks, in
natura gifts, gold coins, ...).
The second possible path is found in Belgium and Sweden, with the Social-
Demcratic parties in office —1987-90 in Belgium and 1982-90 in Sweden. From
then on, unilateral attempts at changing the nature of collective bargaining
come to a halt and, sheltered by the Social-Democratic parties’ belief in the
fundamental freedom of collective bargaining, unions and employers coopera-
tively embark on a rationalization path to make industry more competitive.
In the sections that follow, I will discuss in detail the German case and the
first period in Belgium as examples of the first (labour-capital alliance) pattern
of adjustment, and Sweden 1982-1990 as an example of the second (labour-
state collusion) pattern.
Germany 1982-89: careful reform
Very early on in its first legislature, the Kohl government tried to reorganise the
labour market. After the 1970s decade under the labour-friendly Brandt and
Schmidt (SPD) governments, both ideological considerations and new macro-
economic orthodoxies led the first center-right government in close to a decade
to try new conservative paths. Very early on, however, the government realised
that without the help of employers and labour unions, new policies were
impossible to implement.
Laws were passed which aimed at strengthening the position of employers.
The best-known example is the so called art. 116 of the labour law (AFG),
which punished unions by denying unemployment benefits to workers in
companies that stopped producing as a result of strike actions in other
companies. The wrath of the DGB unions against this law is understandable
since they organize strikes according to a mini-max principle: the minimum11
number of strikers necessary to reach a maximum effect. However, despite the
legal changes, the effect of art. 116 on labour relations has, according to most
observers, been minimal. Witness the strikes in the metal industry in the spring
of 1995, which brought employers to the negotiation table to bargain over wage
increases which even centrist newspaper observers considered reasonable
from the beginning. More important even is the fact that strikes, although often
used as a threat, are simply not important in the practice of collective
bargaining (see Wood 1996 for detaius).
Often government initiatives were considerably more benign and therefore
presumably produced more effect in Germany. Typical examples are the
reorganization of active labour market policy (AFG), or the lowering of early
retirement requirements. Since these policies left the position of the parties in
the labour market basically unchanged, while allowing for more flexible
adjustment, they were supported by both workers and employers.
One thing is important to keep in mind. Even though government policies in
the early Kohl years were designed to tip the balance in favour of employers,
they should not be seen as copies of Reagan-Thatcher policies. German
Christian Democracy, first of all, has a strong “labourite” wing, i.e. people close
to labour without being Social Democrats. The union movement is, after all,
party-political neutral since World War II, and counts at least one Christian-
Democratic member in its executive committee. Second, the German polity is
designed in such a way that government needs the support of organised labour
(as well as employers) for its policies; any too aggressively deregulatory policies
would definitely endanger this support. Hence blind comparisons with the
policies of Reagan and Thatcher in the Anglo-Saxon countries would be
dangerously misleading.
There is also serious evidence that employers’ associations, large firms
and the financial sector were very reluctant to start a deregulatory offensive.
The primary reason was that it was, given their prior strategies, not in their
interest to do so. But, at least as important, for many firms the costs of
engaging unions in an “ideological” conflict —given that it was impossible to
wipe out labour in every relevant institution where it was represented because
of legal protection— was simply too high, not in the least because any
adjustment strategy relied on the cooperation of the local unions and the works
councils, which were protected by law. In sum, instead of unilateral
deregulation, collective bargaining remained the modus of change.
The most dramatic examples of how adjustment in Germany took place on
a negotiated instead of legislated basis, however, are the reorganisation of
working time and the permanent discussions on the dual training system. In
1984, IG Metall organized a series of large-scale strikes to force employers to
negotiate a 35 hour working week. After a few months, the conflict was over,12
after what appeared to many as a setback for the labour unions. In the late
1980s, however, an accord was reached to place the 35 hour week in and in
1995 reduced working time was a fact in many industries. Apart from signals
emanating from Bonn, it is remarkable what a small role the Kohl government
played in the entire matter.
Similarly, in the early 1980s Bonn attempted to deregulate the basic
workers’ training system.
5 Up until then, this was a highly regulated system, in
which unions and employers discussed the organisation and contents of the
training system and were jointly responsible for its administration. Acting in what
it considered to be the interest of employers, the government proposed
changes to bring the system generally more in line with what it thought of as
capital’s interests. Very quickly a coalition of employers and unions (led by the
former) emerged which persuaded the government to drop the matter
altogether. In 1995, as a result, training is organised in essentially the same
parity-based way as in 1980.
All these examples point to the same conclusion. Cornerstones of the
German system of labour relations (still) are the subject of negotiation between
employers and unions, and changes are a result of these negotiations, not of
government initiatives. The weak spot of the system, as current events suggest,
resides in the internal delegitimation of the parties involved - as e.g. today’s
quarreling inside the large metal employers federation Gesamtmetall.
Belgium 1981-87: the search for a new social pact
In Belgium, the first period (1981-87) is, as said, characterised by a period of
deregulatory attempts, but which neither employers nor unions followed blindly.
While employers started a debate on working time reorganisation and greeted a
number of policy measures designed to restructure working time, other
proposals and measures were severely  criticised - most importantly the
government-imposed wage freezes between the devaluation of 1982 and the
return to office of th PS-SP in 1987.  Powerful  employer representatives
criticised the across-the-board nature of the measures, which impeded them to
attract qualified workers, and unions (but some employers as well) pointed out
that workers were paying a larger share of the costs of adjustment —especially
since large companies’ return to profitability had improved considerably after
the 1982-83 devaluation and concurrent measures.
                                                          
5Many thanks to Stewart Wood, who is working on this topic for his Ph.D. dissertation at
Harvard University, for discussing this example with me and thus helping me see clearer. As is
hopefully clear from the short treatment in the text, I owe the entire example to him.13
In response to these restrictive government policies, labour unions and
employers quickly found each other in the firms. Since wage increases were
formally prohibited by government, alternatives mushroomed: under-the-table
raises, lump-sum bonus payments, supplementary payments in kind, such as
restaurant checks, or suddenly appearing gifts from a company to its workers
—a golden Krugerrand, for example.
The deregulation policies of the governments were generally greeted with
some enthusiasm by employers, and while they were particularly supportive of
proposals on working time flexibility (Wijgaerts 1985; Hancké 1985), they were
at the same time very careful not to upset the general social peace in the
collective bargaining system. Despite the general reduction of collective
bargaining activity in the National Labour Council (NAR), the de facto labour
market policy center, neither unions nor employers withdrew from the NAR and
two of the four intersectoral agreements concluded in the NAR in this period
(which, just like laws, cover a particular policy area and are numbered) dealt
with issues that were generally seen as (a) of great social importance and (b)
reflected strong preoccupations of the parties in the labour market without the
other refusing the talks: CAO 39 on new technologies (1983) and CAO 42 on
flexible working time (1987). The first raised the level of workers’ participation in
technical innovation so that —theoretically at least (see Albertijn et al. 1990)—
in combination with other existing measures, they opened the books of the
company almost fully to shop stewards, and allowed for some control over
investment, traditionally an exclusive employers’ prerogative. The second
collective labour agreement was an attempt by the labour unions to control the
wild spread of flexible working time arrangements, (frequently negotiated or
supported by the local union), but mainly on terms suggested by employers.
Even over heavily ideological issues, labour unions and employers kept their
lines of communication open in the difficult years 1982-87.
In all between 1982 and 1987, the year when the Socialist Party returned to
office, the system of collective bargaining underwent important changes, but
not many proved to have had much more than a temporary effect, and those
who did, were not of the kind to fundamentally weaken the labour unions.
Governments played a more important role in labour relations, but as soon as it
became clear that the social partners would find solutions of their own that were
perfectly compatible with government policy, freedom of collective bargaining
was restored. Unions and employers went through a series of vicious rhetorical
rounds in those years, but never truly questioned each others legitimacy.
In retrospect, it became clear that unions and employers  associations
used the intrusive government policies as a way of restructuring Belgium
industry so that it became more competitive (primarily by introducing14
productivity-increasing reorganisations and new technologies) and overall
profitability soared.
6 Collective bargaining decentralised in this new setting, but
it never totally left the control of the industry unions: local variation, e.g. local
wage drift, was always an important element in Belgium (as in Germany and
Sweden) even before the 1980s; between 1980 and 1987 collective
agreements at the company level increased, but so did sectoral agreements.
These latter more often were framework agreements but they covered far more
areas than the more detailed agreements concluded in the years before. Any
assessment of developments in Belgian labour relations is therefore incomplete
unless it addresses stability and continuity as much as change.
Sweden 1982-90: Labour’s march not halted ?
The same is, perhaps even more dramatically so, true of developments in
Sweden. By now, there is a small growth industry which documents the
breakdown of centralised collective bargaining in Sweden and, hence, the
demise of the Swedish model. Two lines of arguments dominate this analysis.
The first emphasizes the economic motives of employers in their moves to
break out system (Pontusson & Swenson 1996; Swenson 1995): first in the
mid-1980s, when in reorganising workplaces, employers in the engineering
sector decided that only wage differentials allowed them to attract the skilled
workers they needed (Elster 1989; Ahlén 1989), and again in the early 1990s,
when SAF disbanded its collective bargaining unit in order to force unions to
decentralize collective bargaining. The second argument amends this
economistic line by pointing out that neutralizing LO also weakened the political
power and electoral appeal of the SAP –which in turn created more fruitful
conditions for further decentralization of labour relations (Martin 1994).
However compelling this account may seem in its analytical transparency
and logic, it ignores fundamental issues and, upon closer look, misrepresents
the changes that have taken place in Sweden since the second half of the
1980s. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of this new debate is that, with the
emphasis on employers, unions almost disappeared from the debate. In theory,
many of the arguments are based on cross-class alliances (see, for example,
Swenson 1989) but generally, the analyses convey an image of unilateral
capitalist control over the economy.
Furthermore, and one of the most important weaknesses of the “older”
literature on Sweden as well, the debate has primarily  concentrated on the
central unions as the most important actors in the Swedish political economy,
                                                          
6 Glyn 1995a demonstrates that throughout the 1980s, profitability in Belgium soared compared
to most trading partners.15
and thus ignored the central actors in this paper: the unions' workplace
organisations, which enable the unions, and therefore the collective bargaining
system, to be much more flexible in responding to change than most observers
suggest.
By emphasising unilateral capitalist control over the economy, and by
ignoring the local labour institutions, many of these arguments end up
mischaracterising the Swedish model as extremely rigid (Locke & Thelen 1995
Pontusson 1994; Swenson 1993; Kurzer 1993). Instead of the simple quasi-
socialist economy, the system was always a flexible three-tier system: central
wage negotiations between SAF and LO were followed by branch negotations,
which were succeeded by company bargaining. As a result, there was sufficient
room for wage differentials to make a career in industry possible, even if the
“wage drift” was lower in Sweden than in other countries —but that was
precisely the consequence of having strong labour unions, which raised the
lowest wages (Martin 1994). Volvo, for example, the largest industrial company
in Sweden, always used its clout in the labour market to attract the qualified
workers it needed.
7
The basis of the argument on rigidities as a result of centralised collective
bargaining is of course, as anybody familiar with the debate knows, the oft-
asserted “Fordist” character of Swedish industry. Sharp hierarchies, Taylorist
work organisation and production for a mass market constituted the micro-basis
for the centralised collective bargaining system, since it made possible an in-
company standardisation of wage rates and other working conditions that would
probably be impossible to sustain in a more flexible economy, relying on fine
gradations of skilled workers (Pontusson 1994).
The problem with this (asserted yet undocumented) argument is that it is
simply wrong. Swedish companies were flexible producers long before others:
Volvo started out as a producer of small series of highly specialised trucks for
extremely small market segments, and remained so until the mid-1950s
(Glimstedt 1993). MTM and similar devices for controlling the labour process —
the core of “Fordism” (Braverman 1974; Coriat 1979)— were not only not
introduced until very late in Sweden; in what are considered the formative years
of the Swedish model, the 1930s and 40s, employers were extremely reluctant
to make them a central part of the organisation of the factory, since they
thought they would evoke major conflicts, and make life in the factory
                                                          
7The company always topped the results of central collective bargaining, by adding an extra at
the end of branch bargaining or pattern bargaining (interview with ex-Volvo shop steward
Björn Mattson in Torslanda, April 1993).16
unbearable for workers and managers.
8 Workers may not have the industry-
specific skills associated with the (German) diversified quality production model
(Streeck 1992), but Sweden has, by all accounts, a highly educated workforce,
with a high emphasis on basic skills (languages, broad scientific and technical
subjects) and communicative skills. Finally, the Swedish export sector is all but
a mass production sector: among the main exporters are Volvo and ABB,
quasi-customised producers (especially true now that Volvo has dropped its
200 series and only produces for the high end with the 850 and the 900 series).
From this reinterpretation of the past to today is only a short step. Since
Swedish industry was never truly “Fordist,” the turn of Swedish industry toward
more flexible production methods, did not herald the elimination of “Fordism”
The demise of the Swedish model is therefore not a by-product of the post-
Fordist turn of Swedish industry. Instead, what appears to have happened in
the Swedish collective bargaining system, is, much less dramatic than most
accounts suggest, a shift from a formal three-tier system (in, say, 1980) to a
formal two tier-system, with strong union coordination at the central and branch
level (in the early 1990s). Currently, after the abolition of the SAF collective
bargaining unit, LO plays a critical role as a behind-the-screens coordinator of
the union side in branch negotiations (still a long way away from decentralised
negotations), resulting in inter-industry wage agreements which are roughly
comparable to those of the heyday of the solidaristic wage policy. More
dispersion has occurred at the firm level, but here as well, the results diverge
not nearly as sharply as some interpretations suggest. Even an attempt by the
three largest firms in the engineering sector, and Sweden’s main exporting
companies —Volvo, ABB and Electrolux— in the first half of 1995 to split the
Metalworkers union over wage policy, failed miserably because Metall was able
to coordinate the collective bargaining strategies of the three concern unions. In
short, despite attempts by employers to radically decentralise, the collective
bargaining system remains highly coordinated by labour unions.
9
                                                          
8 The information is from Henrik Glimstedt, who made these points at a talk on the “Rise and
Demise of Fordism in Sweden,” presented at the WZB, unit “Economic Change and
Employment,” on 13 December 1995.
9Locke & Thelen 1995 argue that one should read these effects differently: it is, not the
“absolute” degree of decentralisation which matters in understanding the demise of teh
Swedish model, but the fact that the core element, symbolic of labour union identity, i.e. central
bargaining, disappeared which is important. Relative to the core strategies, and relative to the
existing previous situation, this change, which is extremely small for other countries (in fact,
would mean a tremendous centralisation of collective bargaining in the UK or the US), implies a
major reconfiguration, and decentralisation, in Sweden. In my view, this not only overstates the
outcome in Sweden; it also misleads observers: Sweden never was what it was made out to be
(i.e. it was always less centralised and with important local structures and practices which
diverged from the central pattern), just as it is not what it appears to be now, according to
accounts (i.e. it is less decentralised and more coordinated).17
Employers may have tried to drive a wedge between the local unions and
the national structures, they were careful not to alienate the local unions. For it
is one thing to demand more flexibility from the national union, it is, given the
highly legally protected position of the local union in the firm, simply impossible
to circumvent the union in the firm. Hence the same companies that attempted
to drive a wedge between the locals and the national union, carefully attempted
to integrate unions more closely into firm-level decision-making. In part this was
a direct outcome of the legal changes regarding co-determination in the 1970s,
but in part this was also Swedish industry’s response to the changing conditions
of international competition.
10
Strong local union structures mattered in a second way. The persistence of
relatively “un-decentralised” collective bargaining is a direct result of the high
unionisation rate in Sweden —for all of the 1980s over 90%, and remaining at
that level, despite the economic turn and rising unemployment.
11 Because of
this, unions actually speak in the name of and retain “control over” their
workforce. And the high unionisation rate, in turn, is a direct result of the strong
local unions, which organise basically every worker the moment he or she
enters the workplace (in fact, the local union also performs the functions that
are associated with works councils in other countries, so there is no competition
from that side).
This story on Sweden thus tells a slightly different tale than both the old
and the current orthodoxy. The changes that have taken place in Sweden are,
first of all, not nearly as dramatic as many accounts suggest: instead of a
formal three-tier system, constructed around solidaristic  wage policy, we find
today a formal two-tier structure, which is more flexible, but still contains many
of the solidaristic elements. Moreover, the argument that decentralisation was
needed because the structure was inherently inflexible, is simply wrong: wage
differentials may have been less in Sweden than elsewhere, they existed, and
the three-tier structure allowed large exporting firms to pay higher wages.
Finally, the conventional picture of Swedish industry’s production profile, the
micro-foundations of the model, has been amended: Swedish industry, then
and now, was always much more “post-Fordist” than the new interpretation
suggests; these were the actual market resources that the unions have at their
disposal which explain the strong role of the locals in the companies. What the
(Social-Democratic) state added, was the legal and otherwise institutional
protection that would make it impossible for employers to dismantle the union
                                                          
10The best-known of these company-level initiatives is probably ABB’s T-50 program and the
organisational changes associated with that (Mahon 1995).
11Some argue that the threat of unemployment provides, because of the union monopoly over
unemployment administration, a rational incentive for workers to join unions (Rothstein 1990).
Given the extremely low unemployment figures in Sweden for all of the postwar decades,
especially the 1980s (when unionisation reached its peak), the argument is highly implausible:
the threat of unemployment was practicaly non-existent, and Swedish workers knew this.18
structures: the Co-determination laws, the labour union monopoly over
unemployment benefits and the (relative to other countries) commitment to
active labour market policy.
Belgium, Sweden and Germany compared: local unions as a power
basis
What these three cases share, is the position of local unions in the politics of
the firm. As a result, any changes initiated by governments or employers have
to pass through jointly or union-controlled bodies of workers representation for
implementation. And because these locals play such a critical role in the
strategic horizons of companies, employers carefully pre-empt conflicts by (a)
self-restricting their own alternatives and (b) involving local unions sections,
directly or indirectly through works councils, in restructuring operations. The
strength of the local also acts as a safeguard against initiatives directed at the
outside labour unions. Aware of the need to retain co-operative relations inside
the company, employers are careful not to attack the sectoral union too
strongly.
The point about this local setup is that it can be the result of legal
arrangements, as in Germany, but it requires strategic actions from the part of
the labour unions as well. Germany, Belgium and Sweden have legally very
different modes of workers’ participation: in Germany  it is dual, with a non-
union controlled, workers-only works council; in Belgium dual with a union-
controlled joint (i.e. employers also) works council; and in Sweden it is a single
system in which the labour union represents workers both inside and outside
the company. Whatever these differences, in all three, the labour unions made
this setting theirs, and thus created the basis for local power.
A concluding note appears necessary here in order to avoid accusations of
naive optimism. Employers in Sweden, Germany and Belgium obviously realise
the importance of the local representative bodies and they therefore attempted
to redraw the lines between the national and the local union. This move would
allow them to attack the national union more easily without having to fear (or at
least not strongly) revenge in the plants (see Hohn 1988 and Kern & Sabel
1990 for Germany; Mahon 1995 on Sweden; Hancké 1991 for Belgium). This
scenario of increased local participation without a transfer of power to the
national level —local productvitiy coalitions (Windolf 1989) or micro-corporatism
( or dualism, in the words of Goldthorpe 1984a), as it is sometimes referred
to— it is crucial to remember, is also a possible outcome of this initial setting.
As of yet, it is unclear which way the coin will fall.19
3.2. Weak employers and strong locals:
the British state deregulates
The second situation is fundamentally different from the first, in that one of the
two parties is strongly organised, whereas the other is extremely weakly
organised. As a result, solidly entrenched local unions, can unilaterally block
modernisation. Employers are incapable of breaking through this dense institu-
tional carcan, and the result is a conflictual stalemate. In order to unblock the
situation, the state was called in. Legislative measures were introduced which
curtailed the power of unions and allowed industry to reposition itself
internationally.
For historic reasons, in part having to do with the capital structure of the
companies, UK employers chose the low and not the high road. Since equity
markets are notoriously more nervous and less patient than banks with debt
stakes in companies, companies in such a financial regime inevitably have to
live with short-term requirements on their results. Hence UK employers
favoured the deregulatory option, since this provided them with the best
guarantees for short-term benefits and short-term adjustment possibilities when
the tide turned; this, in turn, would then be reflected in the quarterly company
reports –the main determinants of the share price (Zysman 1983).
Yet employers are weakly organised, too weakly even to be able to push
through such an “existential” option. The Confederation of British Industry by
and large is incapable of organising its members, and holds no authoritative
command over companies, especially not in collective bargaining (Hyman
1995). Moreover, given the shopfloor strength of British unions, it is rather
unlikely that UK employers would have succeeded had they pursued such a
policy in the companies. Unions in the UK always commanded the shopfloor,
sometimes against management’s wishes, and as late as the 1970s, shop
stewards in fact played a double role, simultaneously as workers’
representatives toward management and as (unpaid) personnel managers, a
role appreciated by most employers. In short, changes on the shopfloor, or
outside the factory but with direct effects on the shopfloor, were bound to meet
with strong resistance by the unions.
Two things were necessary, therefore, for any change in this setting to
succeed.  The first was that a coalition needed to emerge between employers
and government against the labour unions. This happened with the election of
Margaret Thatcher as prime minister in 1979. The second was an outright
attack, by the government and management, on the organisational heart of the
UK unions: the locals. This happened, many times over, throughout the 1980s.
The end result was exactly what employers wanted: a deregulated labour
market which allowed UK employers to compete solely or primarily on cost, an
employer-friendly labour relations system (with many legal and otherwise20
institutional constraints on union activities), and generally considerably weaker
and poorer labour unions. As Howell reminds us, the reliance in much of the
earlier literature on the pure market power (sometimes filtered through
organisations) of unions, ignored the role of the state in providing political
resources for the unions. Once this political support disappeared, the labour
unions were remarkably naked (Howell 1995).
For the purposes of this paper, the story starts with the election of Margaret
Thatcher. After the famous Winter of Discontent in 1979, there is little doubt
that British public opinion was “fed up” with labour unions. The unions had
blocked the country on several occasions during stoppages that winter, and the
general inability of the Labour government to deal with them certainly
precipitated Labour’s defeat in the elections that year. Whatever was true of the
popular images, they were close enough to the experiences of the British to
legitimise aggressive action by government against the labour unions.
Soon after assuming power, the government therefore passed its first of a
series of legislative packages aimed at eliminating the institutional basis of
British unionism. In all, during the 1980s, six such packages were passed,
aiming at the internal operations of the labour unions (internal democracy;
leadership elections), strike action (balloting; picketing; solidarity actions), wage
flexbility, the abolition of anything that remotely gave unions bargaining or
consultation rights in macro-economic decison-making. These measures, it is
important to retain, at the same time delegitimised the labour unions as “macro-
agents,” as actors in collective bargaining and seriousy constrained the room
for action of their locals.
The Conservative legal and institutional offensive was in part helped by and
in part sustained a serious deterioration of the UK labour market. Between
1979 and 1983, in part as a result of government policies designed to curb
inflation and stabilise prices, unemployment soared from 5.3% to 12.9%. Not
only did this contribute to the precipitous drop in the bargaining power of
workers, it also put downward pressure on union membership. Between 1979
and 1984, the TUC member unions lost close to 3.5 Million members, and
density went from over 54% to just a little over 45% –i.e. 9 percentage points.
The growth in real earnings slowed from 4.6% (1978) to 2.5% (1983) and 1.9%
(1984). In sum, the political offensive of the conservatives coincided with an
economic situation which weakened unions even further (all figures from
Hyman 1995).
It was, under these circumstances, hardly a surprise that labour unions
stacked one defeat in battle upon the other. Between 1982 and 1987, several
(symbolically as well as substantively) important strikes were fought and lost.
The two most important of them were probably the Miners’ strike of 1984, which
played against the background of privatisations of the nationalised sectors, and21
the Printers’ strike in 1986, which threatened some of the strongest UK unions
in what must have appeared to many as the single most protected union
bulwark –Fleet Street, where the unions, because of their strategic position in
the newspaper production process, had managed to keep making a newspaper
the closest thing to time travel in a pre-industrial workplace (Sisson 1976). In
both cases, the conflict was long, and required stamina and plenty of resources
from both parties. In both strikes, unions and government in the miners’ case,
and unions and newspaper magnates in the other (the australian Rupert
Murdoch), quickly became aware of –beyond the usual class hype surrounding
such conflicts– the historic role of the conflict. The unions’ loss was therefore all
the more relevant in both. In the case of the mining industry, they heralded the
privatisation of many of the other nationalised industries, thus dismantling the
terrain where trade unions and Labour were strongest. The defeat of the
printers demonstrated to any union in private industry watching, that new
tactics, with government blessing, would be deployed in the class struggle.
The first consequence of this reorganisation of UK labour relations was a
deregulated labour market, which allowed employers to adjust their workforce
flexibly, in line with the short-term requirements of capital markets. Since such
an unstable system leaves little place for deep investment in “human capital,”
UK workers remain under-trained in modern production technology, thus forcing
UK industry to aim for variants of cost-cutting strategies in order to aim for the
low-cost end of product markets (Soskice & Finegold 1988). Cheap labour
makes cheap products.
The second important effect has to do with the labour unions. The
combined attacks on their structures and finances by the Conservative
governments, and the reversal of the bargaining positions, have left the UK
unions extremely weakened. Their membership is currently at an all-time low –
the point, indeed, as Hyman (Hyman 1995) points out, from where the descent
into oblivion started for those labour unions that, for all practical purposes, have
ceased to play a role of importance in their countries (first and foremost,
France). TUC membership was estimated to be below 7 Million in 1994, and
density below 34% (from over 54% in 1979). The weakness is also reflected in
collective bargaining: British unions engage, more than ever before in their
history, in bargaining on employers’ terms. Aggregate wage growth, currently
around 1.5% (1993 and 1994) is one indicator of their weakness in the labour
market, but qualitative evidence, of “New Realism” among labour unions, and of
single-union enterprise agreements, containing non-strike clauses entirely
unimaginable only ten years ago, even more convincingly makes this point.
In some ten years time, the Thatcher decade, British industrial relations
therefore went from the economistic radicalism that characterised the 1960s
and 1970s, where union strategies aimed as much as possible at maintaining
the status quo in every important aspect of labour market regulation, to22
managerial unilateralism. And since managers are forced to deliver to
shareholders –stakeholders do, at least until the next Labour victory, not exist in
the UK, and there are serious doubts if they ever will– they choose the low-
road: low costs, low wages and low quality. Since the Thatcher decade, no
union will stand in their way.
3.3. Weak locals and weak employers:
the French state reorganises
Few countries have seen changes as encompassing as France in the 1980s.
The country witnessed not only a major reconfiguration of labour relations, but
also dramatic changes in macro-economic policy with the adoption of the franc
fort, and a recomposition of capital as a result of privatisations and financial
reform. At the end of the decade, therefore, French industry had seriously
reorganised and was on its way to becoming one of the most competitive
OECD-industries.
The starting point, for the purposes of this paper in 1980, is simple and
well-known to any student of political economy. Organised labour is weak, and
so are employers. Since neither of the two is able to impose its view of society,
but both of them are strong enough to block initiatives from the other, what
results is a social “stalemate.” The only actor capable of unblocking the
situation, is the French state, who has, indeed, become the most important
economic actor after the Second World War.
Two elements, one internal, the other external, shook up this stalemate.
The first was the crisis of French industry in the early 1980s, the other the
microprocessor revolution. These two forced French industry to rethink
fundamental elements of the stalemate such as the organisation of the
company, forms of workers’participation, relations with owners, etc.
In the early 1980s, French industry went through a severe crisis. The
results of the largest exporting companies left little doubt that the French
version of Fordism had run its course, and was turning into an obstacle for
further development. The first crisis dates back to 1980, when Peugeot,
financially over-extended after a merger with Citroën and Chrysler Europe,
suddenly found itself facing a major productivity crisis, but was unable to
finance the necessary investments. Because it was considered exceptional, the
state subsidised Peugeot out of the crisis. A few years later, however, Renault,
the other (state-owned) car maker faced a crisis of the same proportions: in
1984, the company lost FF 12 Billion, and in 1986 it was wryly listed by Le
Figaro (1 Aug 1986) as the top loss-making firm in the world. After these two,
French industry went from one corporate crisis to another (Cohen 1989). In23
1982, Thomson posted losses of over FF 2 bill. In 1986, the steel firms Usinor
and Sacilor combined lost FF 4 bill. (Hart 1992: 109 ff.).
These losses were more troubling than they appear: the French
government had just embarked upon a path of what became known as
“désinflation competitive,” thus not only pre-empting any hopes of an
expansionary policy (Halimi 1992); as a result of this policy, interest rates were
extremely high. The highly indebted, loss-making large firms thus were forced
to quickly and structurally reorganise in order to shed debt, become profitable
and rely on self-financing.
Technological change offered in part the opportunities for French firms to
reorganise in a way that was needed. Employers relatively quickly realised that
they could only take advantage of the   microprocessor revolution if they
integrated workers more closely into production. This would not only make the
investment itself relatively easy to write off, it would also allow for productivity
increases and product flexibility, which would position French industry
competitively.
Here labour relations matter: the central strategic question for large compa-
nies, who want to embark on a path of innovation is one of labour relations.
Even if and when management decides to change, for example, work organi-
zation, labour unions are generally unwilling to support them in this
modernization process, afraid that it will destroy their already tenuous position
in the workplace, and the fundamentally conflictual nature of workplace
industrial relations makes serious changes virtually impossible. In other words,
in a conflictual workplace setting such as the one in French companies, even
“enlightened” management is in itself an insufficient source of change because
of the obstacles that the labour unions provide. How then can French
companies move out of this trap? How can they simultaneously depoliticize
human resources management, by-pass obstinate unions and create more
cooperative workplaces that rely on workers’ skills in order to produce a
different type of goods?
First, in the first half of the 1980s, companies tried to reorganise by rapidly
introducing new technology and by engaging the labour unions in a battle in
order to redefine the power relationship. Both failed. Even new technology,
French engineers discovered to their surprise, need people to staff them and
the unions were, true to the French model, simply too solidly entrenched to be
dislodged. Because the unions, as elite organisations of the working class,
were especially well-equipped for the class warfare inflicted upon them by
employers, every attempt to decimate them, ultimately failed.
Yet, two things had changed after 1981, the year the left took over French
government, and together they would, inadvertently but certainly, change the24
nature of labour relations and human resources in French companies. The first
was a series of laws, passed in 1982, whose aim it was to fundamentally
change French labour relations - the so-called Auroux laws. The other was that
French companies, basically exhausted by the regular gigantic conflicts of the
semi-skilled workers (O.S.), wanted to deal with job content, qualifications and
job classifications, for once and for all. In part in response to the unions, who
seized upon the social conflicts to mobilize against any change, in part forced
by technological change, employers began to redesign jobs and negotiate job
classifications.
These two paralell attempts to reorganize work on the shopfloor had three
(largely unintended) effects. The first one was that slowly but steadily, the
workforce was restructured. Not only were they now less workers, who worked
with more modern technology, but the type of work they performed, required
considerably broader skills than before. As a result, these workers relied on
other means to make their grievances and demands known than the strikes and
negotiations that had characterized industrial life before. Instead of conflicts,
these workers were talking to each other and their supervisors. This change in
workers’ attitudes coincided with a partly state-imposed, partly management-
driven attempt to decentralize decision-making on the shopfloor. In 1982, the
PS government introduced a series of laws to modernize industrial relations,
the Auroux laws (Gallie 1985; Moss 1988). One of the sections of the law dealt
with shopfloor teams of workers who discuss the organization of their part of the
workplace: the groupes d’expression direct (GED). Beside these GED, which
were looked at it with a mixture of fear and amazement by management,
companies began to create their own teams and introduce their own methods
of participative management, most of which were, in conception at least,
borrowed from Japan (Howell 1992). Whatever the actual intentions of the state
and management policies, their net effect was that voice now not only implied
conflict, but could mean cooperation in the workplace as well.
The third effect was that the new composition of the workforce and the new
firm structures that had emerged, created a large set of new challenges for
labour unions. The first was organizational. The unions were incapable of
dealing with the decentralization of decision-making, because they never
developed the type of shop-floor capacity that these new organizational models
required. It was not until after 1968 that unions were allowed to organize in
companies, and even after that their primary focus has been on the economy at
large, not firm-level union work (Eyraud & Tchobanian 1985). The second was
identity. Their structures had been geared toward the low-skilled industrial
worker –of which there were less and less: the workers who remained after
rationalizations, were typically more skilled than those that went. Finally, none
of the unions had a good idea of how to deal with participative management
and decentralized decision-making. In order to define their strategies, they
relied as much if not more than French management on a sharp division of
authority in the workplace, and the new participative structures that were25
emerging created gigantic problems whith that preassumption (Linhart 1991).
Add to this firm-level picture of union problems the general disenchantment of
workers with the politicized French labour unions, and the outcome was a
serious drop in membership, in votes in workplace elections and in influence
generally. (Mouriaux 1993; Rosanvallon 1988).
In the face of these new challenges, the divisions between the reformist
and the radical unions —FO being in the first camp, the CGT in the second and
CFDT permanently hovering in between— became more explicit than ever, and
gradually began to translate into very distinct patterns of adjustment. The CGT
remained in its fortresses and persisted in denouncing capitalism’s evils. FO, on
the other hand, realized that there was a huge opportunity for shopfloor
organization, set up grassroots sections in most of the companies were it was
active, and opted for membership services as a way of tying the workers to FO.
The CFDT, finally, gradually moved from a less hierarchical version of the
radical CGT approach to the FO stance.
The end result of all this was precisely what appeared to be impossible
given the parameters of the French institutional structure. The labour unions,
first of all, ended up in a situation of considerable weakness in the firms. Union
density, one of the prime indicators of market power, dropped to all-time lows in
the private sector during the 1980s, and there is no indication of the downward
trend changing. Far more important, perhaps, than these numerical losses, is
the loss of influence, both vis-à-vis workers and vis-à-vis employers and the
state. Currently, there are more works councillors elected on non-union slates
than union lists --despite the representational monopoly of the unions, which
guarantees them a competition-free first round. Even the “ideological”
disenchantment of French workers with the unions is tremendous. An opinion
poll published by Le Nouvel Observateur (May 1994), for example, claimed that
roughly three quarters of the French workers would like unions to be stronger
generally and particularly in the workplace, but not the unions that exist now.
The distance between workers and unions also shows up in international strike
statistics: France currently ranks among the lowest of the OECD countries with
regards to strikes. None of the large  employers take unions seriously as
negotiating partners and if it were not for the legally defined position in a
number of state agencies (Duclos 1995), neither would the French state. And
perhaps most telling, where strategic partnerships between unions, employers
and the state exist, they are organized around principles of competitiveness
that the employers define, not the issues of social justice that were traditionally
at the core of union programs.
Labour unions basically disarmed, the French workforce today is
considerably more cooperative, and frequently happily participates in what
could be described as local productivity coalitions. In many manufacturing firms,
considerably more broadly skilled workers are making decisions about26
production in teams, directly deal with suppliers, and administer a large part of
their own work. This reorganisation, while invoking continuities with the old
Fench model of firm organisation, also demonstrates French industry’s capacity
for adaptation and innovation, which allows it to position itself more favourably
in international markets. In return for their involvement in company affairs,
workers then receive not only higher wages, but also implicit job security.
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3.4. Coordinated capital and weak local unions:
managerial unilateralism in the Netherlands
The central defining characteristic of the situation in the Netherlands is that
unions get most of their authority and legitimacy from the goodwill of employers.
Once these reconsider, therefore, the labour unions do not have a strong fall-
back position as a result of their local strength. However, because of the
particular characteristics of the national economy’s insertion into the
international economy (for example, relatively low manufacturing content, niche
production where it exists and generally high on finance and other business
services), the outcome may be relatively benign to the work force: unions may
lose control over collective bargaining, but this is not necessarily to the
detriment of employees and workers.
It was against this background that the changes in the 1980s unfolded. As
in the other countries discussed here, in the Netherlands too the stable world of
mass production and stable growth was over. As in other countries as well,
large parts of economic life began to decentralise. And as in other countries as
well, this had consequences for the labour unions and for their position in the
system of industrial relations.
Two developments seem especially relevant. The first has to do with the
union role in the macro-economy. The Netherlands have long been heralded as
a corporatism showcase, in which unions debated, in tri-partite settings, the
direction of the economy (see, e.g. Windmuller et al. 1987; Katzenstein 1985;
Wolinetz 1989). It should immediately be added that this characterisation was
always overly favourable to the role of unions: instead of being a strong party in
negotiations, they had simply abdicated the responsibility for decision-making to
a body of experts, the Socio-Economic Council (SER), which consisted of
employers, unions and the state, and who would pragmatically (but guided, of
                                                          
12It is somewhat outside the purview of this paper, but the adjustment model is not wholly
without negative consequences: because of the characteristics of the new model —reliance on
diplomas as entry tickets into the labour market, geared toward low unit labour costs, etc.— it is
essentially exclusionary . Not everybody’s a winner in the new French model.27
course, by orthodox economics) set targets for wage growth. Even if the unions
disagreed with these goals, they simply lacked the means to make a fist.
Yet whatever the exact role of the unions, there is little doubt that it
diminished sharply in the 1980s as a result of the reduced margins for
redistributive policies. The slowdown of economic growth laid bare the
problems of these models based on wage bargaining by distant peak
associations and the state. When wage bargaining then decentralised in the
1980s, the impact of unions diminished even more.
The second development has to do with the shopfloor and, by extension,
the company. As a result of the Great Exchange in the immediate postwar
years, unions were never very strong there. For most of the postwar period this
did not matter much, since economic growth and the purported role of unions in
macro-economic policies put the emphasis on the national organisation
anyway. In the 1980s, however, lower levels in labour relations began to
develop their own dynamic, which was considerably more independent from the
national level than before. And because the unions did not control these lower
levels, this resulted in a serious loss of legitimacy (Looise 1989).
In large measure, this is a direct result of the institutionalised systems of
workers’ participation in The Netherlands (Teulings 1989). As in Germany,
Dutch companies have an employee-only, formally non-union works council. In
Germany, this “union-free” status never mattered, or at least not until recently,
since the labour unions organised themselves in order to control these
institutions and make them extensions of their own operations. As a result of
the Great Exchange, the Dutch unions never managed to do so as well: there
is, in fact, a sharp divide between union and works council in Dutch companies.
When labour relations decentralised in the 1980s therefore, the local unions
lost whatever legitimacy they had to the works councils.
Disarmed at the firm level, and without a real role at the national level, the
Dutch unions could, in essence, do nothing more than stand and watch how
employers, helped by the Dutch state dismantled parts of the welfare state and
deregulated the labour market.
Employers were, however, split over the deregulation of the labour market.
For the large multinational firms –Philips, Shell, Akzo, ...– regulation was not a
large problem: in the capital-intensive industries (chemicals and
petrochemicals), wages account for such a small proportion of total costs that
any raises there are entirely inconsequential. In sectors where wage
competition was or might be strong, in contrast, Dutch companies had already
shipped all but the extreme high-end products (and these usually only in the
beginning of their product cycle life) to low-wage countries. For the large
multinationals, as for the financial sector, deregulation was not a vital necessity.28
For the small firms, things were different. Since wage costs mattered a lot,
they were in favour of a more deregulated wage-setting regime. However, there
were two important obstacles to this. The first was that, as in most other
European countries, small firms were the junior partner in many of the
employers’ associations, which were dominated by the large firms. As a result,
the demands of small firms did not easily find a place in the programs. Second,
since wages were only one of a large set of issues in labour relations, there
was some fear that far-reaching changes there could have unwanted, and even
very negative repercussions for the small firms in some of the other fields.
Because of these interconnections, it was hardly a surprise that the system
as a whole survived, at least formally. However, deregulation did take place in
the 1980s, and the question is therefore how to understand this. Was it, as in
the UK, the result of deliberate government policies? Or was it negotiated in
order to raise Dutch industry’s competitiveness, as was the case in Belgium?
The answer is that it resulted from neither of these. The deregulation which
eventually ensued was, in contrast to the UK,  not a matter of the state, but
rather the perverse consequence of existing rules. In principle, no actor was in
favour of changing the rules or the legislation, but in practice, many secondary
considerations pushed the companies to undercut the legislative protection of
workers. Hence many new informal arrangements emerged, against which the
labour unions did not have an answer, because they were too weak in the
companies and branches, and therefore lacked the organisational means to
block the attempts at deregulation.
This effect was extremely clear in individual labour law, and particularly in
regulations concerning lay-offs.
13 As a rule, employers have to ask the director
of the local Labour Office for his administrative approval if they want to fire
workers. The director decides on the basis of the employers’ arguments yes or
no; no appeal is possible against this decision within the framework of labour
law, only in civil court. Roughly 80000 such demands are submitted each year,
more or less 85% of which are granted.
The unions are in favour of the regulation, because it is extremely clear cut:
the employer’s wish is granted or not. Small firms appreciate it, because it is
inexpensive: if, after the procedure, the company’s wishes are granted, there
are no gigantic sums to be spent buying off the worker. After authorisation from
the employment office, the worker can be fired without further costs. And for the
large firms, the costs of hiring and firing a worker are marginal given the
company budget, so for them, as for the small firms, the situation is acceptable.
Because of this “objective coalition,” the regulation easily survived the 1980s.
                                                          
13Many thanks to Antoine Jacobs of the university of Tilburg, who presented this example
during a lecture series on comparative labor law at the MSH Ange Guépin in May 1996, and
spent some of his time discussing the general trends in Dutch collective bargaining with me
during that period.29
Yet in the margins of the official labour contract system, new types of
contracts emerged, which effectively circumvented the strict protection offered
by the employment legislation (see Wijgaerts 1985 for an overview). Instead of
regular contracts of indeterminate duration, which are subject to the regulations
described above, employers more often hired workers with fixed-term contracts,
which, by definition, end when the contract ends, without administrative
authorisation. A large new family of labour contracts, some based on existing
forms such as interim work or free lance contracts, others “on call,” emerged, all
of which served to give employers flexibility in their use of the workforce,
without imposing any costs, since none of these were subject to the lay-off
regulations. And, finally, new models of firm organisation emerged —a growth
of sub-contracting and outsourcing, as well as the creation of independent
business units— which made a flexible readjustment of composition and
volume of production and services possible without large costs for employers.
Estimates suggest that, combined, these new contract types account for some
20% of the labour market –adding in the large proportion of part-time workers in
the Netherlands provides a picture in which almost half of the work is done
outside the boundaries set by “typical” labour contracts.
The big movers behind this model are the small firms, for whom their own
general business uncertainty has become increasingly incompatible with the
stability that the employmet legislation provided. In principle it would have been
esay, as one might expect, for the labour unions to block these developments.
For two reasons, however, this appeared to be impossible. The first is simply
that these new regulations do not go against the wishes of a sizeable part of
the workforce, a fact illustrated precisely by the comparatively high proportion of
part-time workers.
Second, and considerably more important, the labour unions are simply
unable to block these developments in the companies. In the field, they are too
weak —here the competition, probably lost already, with the works councils
makes itself felt. The works council are legally obliged (as the German works
councils have to) to protect the general interests of the workforce within the
framework of the general interests of the company. They are, in other words,
not able to act autonomously against management. Furthermore, since the
works councils often define themselves in strict independence, sometimes even
in opposition to the labour union, the autonomous power basis that would result
from a tandem consisting of works council and local union, as in Germany, is
unable to develop (Hoffmans 1992; Van der Heijden 1992). The result is, by
default, managerial unilateralism (Hancké & Slomp 1996).
What makes the case especially interesting from a comparative point of
view, is the minimal role of the state in the whole process. Beside a general
willingness to leave discussions over the direction of the labour market to
unions and employers –which led, in effect, to a situation in which management30
imposed its viewpoint because the unions were too weak to block them– the
Dutch state limited its role to ratifying rather than instigating the deregulation.
The Dutch case therefore demonstrates quite convincingly how the “neo-
corporatist” institutional protection that the unions had mustered over the years,
simply did not provide enough buffers against deregulation attempts. The
explanation is simple: because the labour unions did not develop strong local
structures in the companies, and therefore did not manage to impose
themselves as the legitimate representatives of the workforce, they ended up in
a lethal competition with the works councils —to the benefit of management. As
soon as management attempted to de facto deregulate the labour market, the
unions were unable to block it from above, and to impose costs in the firms
when the firm level gained in importance. This organisational weakness allowed
management to pursue its own, mildly deregulatory path. Neo-corporatism, as
the Dutch experience makes clear, indeed does not translate downward.
4. Conclusion
Throughout the 1980s, two lines of research in comparative political economy
corrected the analyses of the 1970s and 1980s. The first was increased
attention to employers as critical economic actors; the second was the
relevance of local unions. Combining these two lines of research leads to very
interesting answers about how and why particular adjustment patterns of
industrial relations were followed –and probably also, because of the central
importance of labour relations in the political economy of the 1970s and 1980s,
for other dimensions of economic adjustment.
Local unions matter, since they define the room that employers have at
their disposal in attempts to reorganise industry and economy. Broadly
speaking, the general adjustment pattern in Germany, Sweden and Belgium
was co-operative. The reason is, in this view, not primarily because employers
figured unions to be important partners in industrial adjustment —itself
endogenised as an effect of production strategies pursued by employers— but
because the costs of engaging labour unions, through their local sections in the
firm, were considered, probably correctly, prohibitively high. Instead of
confronting labour unions, therefore, employers incorporated them into their
plans and industrial-economic adjustment followed a very different path than in
the other national political economies.
Note, however, that the substantive outcome was not the same in these
three countries. In Germany, workers were generally involved in new product
strategies toward the high end of the market, and the process was supported31
and controlled through the local unions and the works councils. Team work, or
Gruppenarbeit, in the car industry during the second half of the 1980s is the
best-documented example (Turner 1991), but examples can be found in
textiles, banking (Quack & Hildebrandt 1995), and in the chemical industry.
The Swedish outcome looks very similar. ABB and Volvo are the best-
known examples of new patterns of work force integration linked to high-end
production controlled and supported by labour unions. The few cases where
employers attempted to confront labour ended in defeat and they too were
forced up-scale.
The new settlement in Belgium is of a different nature. It followed a period
of intense social strife and attempts by government and employers to
deregulate the labour market. Instead of the status quo ante, however, the
unions were aware of possible cost-competitiveness problems and the final
results were firm-level productivity coalitions within a generally stable collective
bargaining system. Belgium currently has among the highest wages in the EU,
but also highest labour productivity; unit labour costs are therefore among the
lowest in the EU. This cost advantage was linked to production for the sub-top
and high end of the market and resulted in a relatively stable new system.
Whatever separates Germany, Sweden and Belgium, they share that local
unions managed to force adjustment out of the deregulation option in favour of
a high-end strategy.
In the other cases considered, the initial situation was less benign to
organised labour, and that shows in the final results. Again, however, the
different starting points produced very different outcomes. In the UK, the result
was nothing less than all-out class warfare, in large part because the labour
unions, through their strong locals, were strong enough to resist steam rolling
by employers. Yet, not being integrated into firm-level decision-making
structures, and generally not interested in the firm as an arena for strategic
social change, the unions were unable to add much in the form of ideas to the
fist they made. Once broken, their resistance turned out to be an empty shell.
In the Netherlands and France, respectively, the situation was different still,
because one actor among the three —labour, capital and the state— was
clearly dominant: employers in the Netherlands and the state in France. The
two others were by and large dependant upon their initiatives. The line this
actor took then provided the guiding thread and adjustment roughly followed
this line. In the Netherlands, the outcome was relatively straightforward
managerial unilateralism, but not blind deregulation.
The French experience was somewhat different. The ubiquitous state
attempted reforms, which virtually all failed in their goals, but combined they
changed the French system. For organised labour, the outcome was simply32
disastrous, because the strong politicisation of the labour movement forced the
state and employers to exclude them. But it was, by most measures, not nearly
as disastrous for workers and employers: French companies may today still be
a far cry from the (idealised) German model (Albert 1991), but they do offer
their work force careers built on co-operation and broad skill acquisition
(Méhaut 1994).
In both the Netherlands and France, labour unions have become largely
irrelevant actors, unclear about how to cope with the new situation. In these two
countries, union density levels dropped far below any of the other cases
considered here, and decentralised collective bargaining appears to have taken
the strongest hold of all the countries discussed here. Yet in both countries,
firm-level islands exist where new co-operative relationships have developed
between (subordinate) unions and management.
In conclusion, then, this paper made two contributions. The first is that it
put local unions on the map, both of academic analysis and of the employers’
cognitive world. Without bringing local unions into the strategic calculations, it is
in many cases simply impossible to understand employers’s strategies,
government policies and industrial relations outcomes. The second contribution
is that it raises the analysis above simple institutionalist models by emphasising
the actions of local unions. For one should not ignore that expressed in terms of
the purely formal institutions, Germany and the Netherlands share exactly the
same works councils system, heralded in most of the analyses of  the German
situation (Streeck 1991; Slomp 1990). Yet they ended up on opposite sides of
the analysis in this paper. France and Belgium share the same (other) works
councils model, but again, ended up in different places. What put Belgium and
Germany, on the one hand, and France and the Netherlands, on the other, in
the same categories for the purposes of this paper, were the actions of local
labour unions in occupying the field offered by these institutions.
Institutions therefore always have many different possible faces, and ade-
quately understanding their effects statically, i.e. without taking into account the
different uses actors can make of them, is impossible. If this paper contributed
anything to the contemporary debate in political economy, I hope it is that
reconstructing such strategic choices, both in the past, when new institutions
were built, and now, when they appear to “constrain” economic actors and
these therefore try to redesign them, is a necessity for understanding labour
outcomes. Since institutions are dynamic and “plastic,” one cannot deduce their
effects from their shape; what actors actually do with them, is just as important.33
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